








































































































































































































































































































I 



rkss ii E2 2 3L 



\ 

« 

I 

I 


I 


i 

• I 


¥ 
















.2. 


BEFORE THE UNITED STATES ANTHRACITE 
COAL COMMISSION 


EMPLOYES EXHIBIT NUMBER- 



OPERATING AND FINANCIAL 
PERFORMANCE OF ANTHRA- 
CITE RAILROADS 


Presented by 

W. JETT LAUCK 


On behalf of 

John L. Lewis, President 
Philip Murray, Vice-President 
F. P. Hanaway, International Representative 
Percy Tetlow, Statistician 


John Dempsey 
Thomas Kennedy 
Chris. J. Golden 


I Committee Representing 
( Districts 1, 7 and 9 


Of the 

United Mine Workers of America 

WASHINGTON 

1920 


18 





.s, ' ./ II 

i' • i' 

s I 

: ( 

■i, •, I 

', ^ I 

I >' 

,'/>■ 

I « , 



'• •( 


;j,’ 

-•) 


V<- • 

• / ■ k 

I \ , 

< 

h- 

\ I 
// 

• * 


fi, of 
AUQ 24 1920 





I 


i 


I 


« 






BEFORE THE UNITED STATES ANTHRACITE 
COAL COMMISSION 


EMPLOYES EXHIBIT NUMBER- 


OPERATING AND FINANCIAL 
PERFORMANCE OF ANTHRA¬ 
CITE RAILROADS 


Presented by 

W. JETT LAUCK 


On behalf of 


United Mine Workers of America 


WASHINGTON 




e.eY\ 






•/, , 

f 


* 




^■' f ■ •’^^1 'j V 'VlV* ' V 





PART I 
EARNINGS 


i 





EARNINGS OF ANTHRACITE RAILROADS. 


1. Introduction. 

The preceding study has been confined to the profits of the anthra¬ 
cite industry as reflected in the earnings of the coal mining com¬ 
panies and their affiliated sales organization. The profits of these 
companies, though they have been enormous, do not reveal the full 
extent of the profiteering which has characterized the production of 
anthracite. In order fully to disclose the immense profit which has 
been exacted in the anthracite industry, it is necessary to consider 
also the earnings of the anthracite carrying railroads. The practical 
identity of the anthracite carriers and the principal mining com¬ 
panies has resulted in huge additional profits being taken from cun- 
sumers in the form of exorbitant freight charges for the transporta¬ 
tion of anthracite to the principal markets. 

The anthracite railroad coal companies, as pointed out above, in¬ 
cluding the coal departments of the railroads mining coal, control 
approximately 80 per cent of the total commercial production of 
anthracite. These railroad coal companies are in turn controlled by 
the eight important anthracite carrying railroads. As the coal com¬ 
panies are for practical purposes owned by the carriers the freight 
rate has for them a peculiar significance. A high freight rate means 
that greater profits come from transportation than from the mining 
of coal. A low freight rate, on the other hand, means that greater 
profits are derived from mining than from transportation. In either 
case the profits from both sources ultimately, though in a round¬ 
about way in some cases, go into the coffers of the railroads. It is 
immaterial therefore whether the greater profits be made on trans¬ 
portation or in mining except in so far as the disclosure of exorbi¬ 
tant profits in either branch of the industry endangers the monopo¬ 
listic combination which has made such profits possible. 

Excessive Freight Charges. 

How] effectively the anthracite carriers have utilized their position 
to extort the maximum profits from the industry is indicated by a 
comparison of the freight rates charged for the transportation of 
anthracite with the operating cost of transportation. Official data 


5 


6 


of unquestioned accuracy are available for this purpose from the 
records of the Interstate Commerce Commission and from the files 
of the Pennsylvania State Railroad Commission. The Interstate 
Commerce Commission, for example, ascertained in 1912, for the 
Central Railroad of New Jersey, the operating cost (including the 
cost of returning empty cars to the mines) of the transportation of 
anthracite from the principal mining districts to tidewater. This 
investigation showed the cost per ton to be 59.3 cents from the 
Wyoming region, 44.4 cents from the Lehigh region and 49 cents from 
the upper Lehigh region. On the other hand, the average freight 
rate charged by the Central Railroad Company of New Jersey for 
coal transported at such cost was found to be $1.40 per ton. The 
freight rate, in other words, was from two and one-half to three 
times as great a^ the actual operating cost. 

Additional light is thrown upon the exactions of the anthracite 
carriers by an investigation into the cost of transporting anthracite 
coal which was made by the Pennsylvania State Railroad Commis¬ 
sion in 1914. At the time of this investigation the freight rate for 
anthracite for delivery in Philadelphia over the Pennsylvania Rail¬ 
road and the Philadelphia & Reading varied from $1.25 to $1.70 
per gross ton, according to the size of the coal. The commission’s 
inquiry, made under approved accounting methods, showed that 
during the twelve months ending May 31, 1913, it cost the Reading 
Railway 44.7 cents per gross ton to carry anthracite from the Schuyl¬ 
kill field to Philadelphia, and that it cost the Pennsylvania Railroad 
61 cents by one route and 54.4 cents by another. In general, the 
freight rate was three times the cost of transportation over the 
Philadelphia & Reading, and more than twice as great as the cost 
over the Pennsylvania. These costs, like those of the Central of 
New Jersey, are operating costs, and make no allowance for a return 
on the investment. But they show that for the carriers generally 
there is little relation between the rates charged and the cost of 
doing the business. 


Relation of Anthracite to Total Freight Traffic. 

It is significant to note in this connection that the proportion 
of the total freight rates of the anthracite carriers which came in 1913 
from the carriage of hard coal ranged from a minimum of 6.4 per 
cent for the Pennsylvania to a minimum of 63.6 per cent for the 
New York, Ontario & Western. The Lehigh Valley Railroad, for 
example, in 1913 carried 14,732,949 gross tons of anthracite. Its 


7 


gross earnings from the transportation of this coal were |18,556,161, 
which was over 50 per cent of its gross freight receipts and 43 per 
cent of its total operating revenue. Its gross earnings per net ton 
mile from the carriage of anthracite were 7.11 mills, and from’ all 
other freight 5.67 mills, or 25 per cent greater for anthracite. In 
view of the large part which hard coal plays in the total receipts 
of the Lehigh Valley, it is evident that the rate charged for anthra¬ 
cite is highly remunerative.' 


Dividend Disbursements. 

More conclusive evidence of the immense profits which have ac¬ 
crued to the anthracite companies is contained in the table below, 
which shows the common stock dividends paid by these companies 
since the development of the Anthracite Combination in 1898. 


‘Interstate Commerce Commission Investigation of Anthracite Rates, XXV, 
Morgan £]xhibits. Nos. 36 and 38. 



COMMON STOCK DIVIDENDS PAID BY THE ANTHRACITE CARRIERS—1898-1918. 


8 


Lehigh Coal 
Navigation 
Co. 

Per cent. 

^^Ud<DLO<DK>OOOOOOOOC^.COOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO 
iH rH rH CO 

New York, 
Ontario & 
Western. 

Per cent. 


Erie. 

Per cent. 

- 

Pennsyl¬ 

vania. 

! 

Per cent. 


! 

1 

Delaware 

& 

Hudson. 

Per cent.. 


1 Delaware, 

Lackawanna 
& Western. 

Per cent. 

l>t^l>C-I>t>t^0000U50liti00000U50 

rHC<lC<ie^CqOOC<ILOC<|C^C^C^CaC<1C^ 

Lehigh 

Valley. 

Per cent. 


Central 

of 

New Jersey. 

Per cent. 

c^ooooooooooooc^cqcqc<ic^ocsi^cq 

rH rHiHTHrHrHTHrHTHTH 

Reading 

Company. 

Per cent. 

• 

i 

Year. 

1 

0005OrHCaC0ThU:^^t-00CJOiHC^C0’T^l0«Dt>CX) 

O^O^OOOOOOOOOOrHrHrHrHrHiHrHrHiH 

iHrHTHrHTHr-irHrHrHrHTHTHrHTHrHiHr-trHTHTHrH 


^ The Central of New Jersey paid regular quarterly dividends of 2 per cent in 1902, but none are shown because of a change in the 
date of the annual report. 

2 Including a 10 per cent stock allotment at par. 

* Including a 10 per cent stock allottment at par and a 16 per cent scrip dividend. 























































9 


By reference to the table it will be seen that the Lackawanna 
paid annual dividends of 7 per cent on its capital stock from 1898 
to 1903. In 1904 dividends were increased to IT per cent, and since 
1905 the annual rate has never been less than 20 per cent. In 1909 
the company paid in cash dividends to its stockholders the enormous 
aggregate of 85 per cent, of which 37% per cent was allowed to be 
used for subscribing to Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Coal 
Company stock at par. In 1917 the dividend aggregated 55 per 
cent, and in 1917 the stockholders received a total of 25 per cent. 
During the period covered by the table the dividend disbursements 
of this company, in brief, have amounted to a total of 444 per cent, 
or to an average annual rate of 21 per cent. It is significant to 
note also that the company’s surplus on December 31, 1918, was 
157,247,984, or about |15,000,000 in excess of its entire capital stock 
outstanding. 

The profits of the Lehigh Valley Kailroad in recent years also 
have been very great. No dividends at all were paid from 1894 to 
1903, but in 1904 the railroad began to pay 10 per cent upon its 
preferred stock, a rate which it has since maintained, and 1 per 
cent upon its common stock. In 1905 the rate on the common stock 
was increased to 4 per cent, in 1907 to 6 per cent and in 1911 to 10 
per cent, a rate which is still paid, and, in addition, in 1912 10 per 
cent extra was given, making a total of 20 per cent. In connection 
with these liberal dividend disbursements the railroad also has 
accumulated a large surplus. By 1909 it had a surplus of more 
than 119,000,000. In 1910 this surplus had risen to $27,000,000, 
and by 1911 to over $30,000,000. In 1912, largely because of the 
payment of the extra dividend of 10 per cent, the surplus declined 
to $23,400,000, but increased in 1913 to $25,000,000, and in 1918 was 
about $24,000,000. 

The Central Railroad of New Jersey, to cite another example, 
gradually increased its regular dividend rate from 4 per cent in 
1898 to 8 per cent in 1912. In addition the company in 1903 and 
from 1910 to 1918, inclusive, paid 4 per cent extra, making 12 per 
cent in all. In 1917 14 per cent was paid. Of the various anthracite 
carriers, the heavily overcapitalized Erie is the only company which 
has paid no dividend since 1898. 

Net Earnings. 

The vast amount disbursed in dividends by the anthracite carriers 
does, however, not fully measure their prosperity. The actual earn¬ 
ings of these companies have been much greater than the dividends 


10 


declared. By reference to the table below it will be seen that the per 
cent earned on the capital stock by the Delaware, Lackawanna & 
Western during the period 1913-1918 ranged from 24.35 to 36.4. 
In the case of the Lehigh Valley, net income on capital stock varied 
from 10.79 per cent in 1915 to 29.2 per cent in 1918. The Central 
Railroad of New Jersey during the period under consideration 
shows a net income on capital stock varying from 10.54 per cent to 
26.73 per cent. Although certain of the railroads shown in the table, 
including companies such as the Erie and the Ontario, which have 
been the victims of financial mismanagement, failed to earn their 
fixed charges in 1918, each of these companies, as a matter of fact, 
increased its surplus materially over 1917. As a result of the guar¬ 
anteed return paid to these carriers by the Railroad Administra¬ 
tion the actual return to the stockholders in 1918 in the form of net 
income was 11.09 per cent for the Delaware & Hudson, 8.88 per cent 
for the Pennsylvania, 4.14 per cent for the Erie and 1.4 per cent for 
the New York, Ontario & Western. A comparative statement of net 
income by railroads for the period 1913-1918 follows: 


11 


o 

o 

H 

CO 


Lehigh Coal 

& Navigation 

Company 

per cent. 

CO lO 0> tH • Oi 

CO t> • kP 

• •*•••• 

00 a> 00 o iH • o 

iH r-H • 

New York, | 

Ontario 
& Western 
per cent. 

00 kO Pi 00 O • 

O tH O CP O • 

• •••••• 

C^ tH rH iH rH tH • 

• 

Erie 

per cent. 

CP tH O kO ^ • 

tH 00 kP Oi O iH • 

• ••»••• 

O O U3 iH • 

• 

Pennsylvania 
per cent. 

o CP CP o O 00 

O iH CP 00 IP 00 TjJ 

00 CP O t> 00 O 

iH 

} j 

Delaware 
& Hudson 
per cent. 

pq oo CP IP Pi Cd 

TjJ CP O CP O 00 

CP Pi CO CO tH tH T-i 
iH tH tH rH tH 

Delaware, 
Lackawanna 
& Western 
per cent. 

kp kp cq CO 

c<j CO i>- Pi Pi eq 

cq kp Pi CP CO IP 

CO cq cq cq CO CO CO 

Lehigh 
Valley 
per cent. 

CP IP Pi o cq 

CP O 00 Pi P^ 

• •••••• 

^ th o CO iH o cq 

rH iH tH tH tH ^ 

Central of 
New Jersey 
per cent. 

CO CP 00 l> Pi CO ^ 

t> 00 CO CP tH kP 

• ••*••• 

CP o Ci tH Tti CO O 

cq cq iH cq cq tH tH 

Reading 
Company 
per cent. 

Tt< CO kP kP IP *00 

cq l> rH l> -CO 

• •••*•• 

CP CP CP • 

• •• 

Year 

• •••••• 

• •••••• 

• • 

• • • • • 

• • 

• • • • • 

CO ^ kP CP ^ ^ 

rH tH tH tH ^ tH 

Pi Pi Pi Pi Pi Pi Pi 

tH tH ^ rH iH iH 


o 

o 

o 

<v 

Q 

o 

o 

a 

H-» 

05 

O 

o* 

Ui 

o 

O 


^ — 

(D CO 

I? 

kS 

(X) 

(D 

4-d a> 

a a 

21 

a 

D O 


O 

<D 

I 

O 

a 

HH 

o 

Q< 

O 


ooo 

































. .• T 






‘ ■ / . k j . 


‘‘. V. ^i*. L’‘%V/-w f •, .» . ■ . 

’ \S >••' *; . ♦iT' .fc ‘* . ‘ ‘ ,y *, •* 

- v-.,.w«3ii^^''' ^ r' - •• .'^.^ ’^* 

fL^VjiKXBnM>*» ' ‘1KI&#P^_' v^ti. w. k. ,r * 


V'-'i’?. .■ .. -iV” p. 



^ -.'k'.r- 


I • ^ •' 


|V:> ■;•'■/'.>. 


.; - v.-. . • -i, I • 




V . 


: ^V ^ '■■' 

. ..' '.'* k ' V\- ' \ * < • 

* ’ "T * '^' i ' • * . 




Y ^ JmMAm Cl ^ V * ^ ^ *▼>? k ^ y^' .ss K H K ^k. 1 ^ / i ** 

^ifif' *'''■* '■^'^ 'r "' ■''■ ■N^ V^ 'i ^ 


wr^ v ... 

V / -<•*■ •k^ • '. J / I ■ 


,♦ • i^''*'^^■ '*‘1 
; "d 

u i.r ' *>0 





'■/ 


^ --iTi - A 



- ■, ‘ '• 
^ ■*r ^ 

»■ A,V ' , 

•■ i ' 


•':vW>'' ;f ,.J 

'J't'' W 
;!*^\j*i^i '''.: if crJSI^- 


'rH' 



*iViK 


•^v 


-» 

* 


tvtvwjr 

f v: - 

;vvV*j;Kk; -^v-.- 


r 


;*>v ^ 


' <v'tv 



^ •. 


I .^ .• 


rw 



''anipiHH^>^,i.i;/>V . 


?>:%‘m’’'' • '' ’’ ”', ' ' .' . ?'' >■'' '* ■■ ' ''• 

•■ " . .... . 

''' . <' .> .’■•i.»!-. ‘ i •* ' ‘ 

■^; 7 .■.:•^:^ "•-. ... .• 

iA:^ V- ■^' j/ ' ■•: ^^■;♦v -V 


MA'] -.-• t j; ^.. 




SLv^v’^' '. ; /. ■ iArc i|—Miiiiii ■•^’ ./ ^'f v .‘ -^x 

.\!."':v'*^’>^w' '■ '■ ■ s*-.' 

_....' ■ ' • - .• . ■ /A &i5 

A 




>Vi 


iC' 




'...■A*-', 

' #»*♦ .••“•’ 


.rr# 


•;'r 


4 ^ 


«:**?.• '< ' *■••' \V' ■ ->*i' v' 

^W90H^S€^Il< JT.% , ■•*v.'^-‘^••'^ '■ • ■' 

wm?:- ^ K - 



—.■'I'V'V'''^-^-' -■ ' '' ''^ .' /^I 

AX e*^ ■■:■, .1.- ; i'*5 rXr.** 

, :..!.“•U'ii.,vi->i: - .'. 


'n.'>? 


r*' 







PART II 


FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 




1. Financial Management op the Anthracite Railroads. 


The rate of return on the capital stock of the anthracite railroads, 
discussed in the preceding section, does not represent the rate 
which the stockholders receive on the capital actually invested. In 
order to show the return on actual investment it is necessary to 
deduct from the capitalization of these companies the capital liabili¬ 
ties which they have incurred through financial mismanagement. 
The Erie Railroad, for example, is notorious for its excessive 
capitalization, and it is safe to assume that practically all of its 
capital stock is water. The securities of the Reading Company and 
the New York, Ontario & Western also are heavily watered, and the 
financial excesses of the Pennsylvania, the Delaware & Hudson, the 
Lehigh Valley, and the Delaware, Lackawanna & Western have bur¬ 
dened these companies with a large amount of unnecessary capitali¬ 
zation. If, from the capital stock of these companies are deducted 
the securities issued as a result of financial mismanagement, it will 
be found that the rate of return reported above falls far short of 
the net income earned on that proportion of their capital stock 
which represents actual investment. 

2. Over-Capitalization op the Reading Company. 

The financial history of the Reading Company and of its subsi¬ 
diaries—the Philadelphia & Reading Railroad Company and Phila¬ 
delphia & Reading Coal and Iron Company—furnish a conspicuous 
example of the excesses which have characterized the management 
of the anthracite railroads. The over-capitalization of that com¬ 
pany may conservatively be placed at |113,000,000. This is equiva¬ 
lent to its entire issue of common and second preferred stock, and 
represents in addition about |1,000,000 of its issue of |26,000,000 in 
first preferred stock. 

The active history of the Reading Company dates from 1896, 
when it was organized as successor to the National Company. The 
latter company was capitalized at |50,000, but had no assets except 
some worthless railroad securities, and no apparent function except 
that of preserving its organization. Its successor, the Reading 
Company, as the records in the case show, was organized primarily 
to act as a vessel for the water that was to be injected into the 


16 



16 


securities of the Philadelphia & Reading Railroad Company and 
the Philadelphia & Reading Coal and Iron Company. There were 
other reasons, such as holding the coal properties which had for¬ 
merly belonged to the railroad, but the principal object was to 
provide a medium for capitalization. 

When acquired by the Reading Company in 1896 the Philadel¬ 
phia & Reading Railroad Company and the Philadelphia & Reading 
Coal and Iron Company had just emerged through foreclosure and 
reorganization from the hands of receivers. 

The combined capitalization of the three companies at this period 
was 1382,003,157, including |189,450,000 par value in new securities 
issued by the reorganized companies in exchange for stocks and 
bonds of the old corporations. The average market value of the 
new securities as reflected by the stock-market quotations for four 
months after all assessments were paid was only |76,175,727, or 
1113,274,373 less than their par value. It is evident, therefore, that 
there were no such tangible assets as the new capitalization called 
for, and it was necessary to create fictitious values in order to 
justify the liabilities incurred by the Reading Company in the 
acquisition of these securities. 

As a part of this process the Reading Company in 1898 entered 
on its books an item of $64,617,301, representing advances by the 
Philadelphia & Reading Railroad Company to the Philadelphia & 
Reading Coal and Iron Company prior to the reorganization of 
these companies in 1896. Under proper accounting methods this 
item, which was legally extinguished by the foreclosure and sale of 
the Philadelphia & Reading Coal and Iron Company, should have 
been eliminated from the accounts of each company. Instead, it 
was entered on the new balance sheet of the Coal and Iron Company 
as a liability to the Reading Company, which carried it as an asset 
as advances on account of cost of property. This item, which was 
capitalized at $66,972,192, represented nothing more tangible than a 
bookkeeping entry, as was admitted by attorneys for the Reading 
Company themselves a few years later. 

A second item in the Reading assets which was water was 
$20,000,000 in purchase money bonds issued by the Philadelphia & 
Reading Railroad Company without consideration and given to the 
Reading Company. If there was any cash received for this issue, 
it is not set forth in the railroad’s reports to the Coal & Iron 
Company. 

Another instance of the financial excesses which characterized the 
Reading Company occurred in 1900, when a controlling interest was 


17 


purchased in the capital stock of the Central Railroad Company of 
New Jersey. In order to acquire this stock the Reading Company 
issued 4 per cent bonds of the par value of 123,000,000. The market 
value of the stock when purchased, on the other hand, was only 
$21,151,250. Thus a total of $1,848,750 in securities was issued in 
excess of the value of the property received in return. 

It is unnecessary to go into all the details of the past financial 
history of the Reading Company, but the facts conclusively show, 
as pointed out above, that not less than $113,000,000 of its capital 
stock is water. The dividends disbursed by the Reading Company 
on this fictitious capitalization in 1918 amounted to $7,320,000, and 
during the last 10 years alone will aggregate more than $60,000,000. 

3. Financial Excesses of the Lehigh Valley Railroad. 

In the flotation of securities at prices below their market value the 
Lehigh Valley Railroad has issued for underwriting fees and in stock 
bonuses since 1900 securities of the total par value of $6,802,805, and 
has put out $5,755,639 in unnecessary capitalization, imposing an 
annual charge upon the company for interest and dividends upon 
these unnecessary securities of $475,000. In addition to this dissipa¬ 
tion of its resources an extra dividend of 10 per cent, or $6,068,000, 
disbursed to the stockholders of the railroad in 1911 to enable them to 
purchase stock in Lehigh Valley Coal Sales Company, represents an 
annual loss to the railroad of approximately $303,400. A total of 
$10,199,700 was also wasted in the purchase of securities of the Dela¬ 
ware, Susquehanna & Schuylkill Railroad Company and Coxe 
Brothers & Company, Inc., in 1906 at an excessive price, imposing 
an annual interest charge upon the railroad of $407,998. Certain 
coal company investments of the Lehigh Valley Railroad have 
caused it a further loss since 1906 of $527,000 annually, and it has 
disbursed on account of its lease of the Morris Canal & Banking 
Company approximately $12,000,000, which is not shown to be rep¬ 
resented by any material addition to the earning power or assets of 
the company. 

In order to give a clearer idea of the methods by which the re¬ 
sources of the Lehigh Valley have been dissipated, a brief review 
of the more flagrant excesses which have characterized its financial 
managment will be of ralue. 

In the year ending 1859 the railroad declared a stock dividend 
of 3 per cent, in 1860 one of 8 per cent and in 1861 there was one 
of 2 per cent. In 1864 there was an extra stock dividend of 55% 


18 


per cent. Taking par as a fair basis, this was a donation to the 
stockholders of over |i,100,000. In 1866 there was another stock 
divindend of 10 per cent declared. The market quotation when this 
was issued was 136 (on a |100 par) and the stockholders received 
a further benefit of over |900,000. 

During the year ending 1884 there was an increase in the capital 
stock of 15,300,000 allotted to stockholders at par when the quota¬ 
tion was 142%, making still another donation of $2,252,500. Again 
in 1887-88 the stock was further increased by $6,500,000, and on the 
date of the determination of distribution of this among the stock¬ 
holders at par (i. e., March 17, 1888) Lehigh Valley was quoted at 
112. This, therefore, made $780,000 practically given away to the 
stockholders. 

Since 1900 the record of the Ijehigh Valley, in the dotation of 
securities below their market value, in the issue of unnecessary 
capitalization and in the dissipation of its resources has been as 
follows: 

During the two years 1901 and 1905 the Lehigh Valley Railroad 
Company issued for cash bonds to the par value of $18,300,000. 
The market value of these obligations, based on contemporaneous 
market values, was $18,553,580, but the railroad realized from their 
sale only $17,718,500. In other words, $835,080 was paid in under¬ 
writing fees for fioating these securities. The annual interest at 4 
per cent upon this unnecessary disbursement of $835,080 is $33,403. 

In 1906 the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company exchanged its col¬ 
lateral trust 4 per cent gold bonds for the capital stock of Coxe 
Brothers & Company, Inc., and the capital stock of the Delaware, 
Susquehanna & Schuylkill Railroad Company. The business of 
Coxe Brothers & Company was that of mining and selling coal. The 
railroad consisted of 30.63 miles of main line and 17.60 miles of 
branches. On the basis of 9 per cent dividends, which both of these 
companies paid in 1904, the shares could not have been worth more 
than $200 per share, which would make a total market value of both 
companies of approximately $8,820,300. The stock of four water 
companies, of a total value of $60,000, was included. 

The net result of this transaction, therefore, was that the Lehigh 
Valley Railroad issued $19,000,000 of 4 per cent collateral trust 
bonds for property which had a market value of $8,880,300. The 
railroad company, therefore, paid a bonus of $10,199,700. The an¬ 
nual interest charge upon this indebtedness, for which no property 
or earning value was acquired by the company, is $407,998. 


19 


The Morris Canal & Banking Company, which was leased by the 
Lehigh Valley Railroad in 1871, has been a continual drain on its 
resources. There have been but four years in which the canal com¬ 
pany earned its operating expenses, and the railroad company has 
been compelled to make up the deficit and in addition pay dividends 
of 10 per cent and 4 per cent, respectively, on its capital stock, as 
well as excessive underwriting fees on the sale of its bonds. 

The total charges assumed by the railroad company under the 
lease of the canal company for interest on bonds, dividends on stock 
and for the maintenance of the corporate organization of the com¬ 
pany amount to $256,000 per annum. During the forty-four years 
the lease has been in operation, therefore, it has resulted in a loss 
to the railroad, not including advances to cover operating deficits, 
of approximately |11,000,000. When the advances to cover these 
deficits are taken into consideration, the total loss to the railroad 
on account of its commitments in this ill-advised undertaking ap¬ 
proximate $12,000,000. 

The annual reports of the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company to 
the United States Interstate Commerce Commission show that in 
each year, 1906 to 1911, inclusive, the interest paid on bonds of 
the railroad company issued to pay for coal properties has exceeded 
the interest received on bonds and dividends of the coal companies 
by approximately $300,000. 

In December, 1913, the Lehigh Valley Railroad sold to Drexel & 
Company $10,000,000 of 4% per cent general consolidated mortgage 
bonds. The market value of these bonds based on market prices 
from February to May, 1914, inclusive, the first four months during 
which these securities were bought and sold on the New York Stock 
Exchange, was 99.266 per cent of par. An issue of $9,066,548 of 
these bonds at the market price would have yielded the railroad 
the amount actually realized from the sale of these securitips. The 
annual interest charge on this excessive issue of $933,452 is $42,005. 

On June 22, 1910, an issue of 403,338 shares of stock to stock¬ 
holders at par ($50) was authorized, and the share capital of the 
road was increased by this amount. During the year the stock of 
the road varied in price on the stock exchange from 121% to 62% 
per share. Hence even at the lowest quoted price of the year, the 
stock might have been sold for $5,041,725 more than was obtained 
for it. In other words, in order to obtain funds totaling $20,166,- 
900, capital stock of this par value was issued, where the same sum 
might have been obtained by the sale on the open market, even at 
the lowest prices of the year, of only $16,136,200 par value of stock. 


20 


The capital stock was therefore increased unnecessarily by |4,000,000 
in this transaction, which at the present dividend rate of 10 per 
cent entails an additional charge to the road of 00,000 annually. 

Early in 1911 an extra dividend of 10 per cent, totaling |6,068,000, 
was given to stockholders to enable them to purchase capital stock 
of the Lehigh Valley Sales Company of this par value. In other 
words, the stockholders were given Lehigh Valley Coal Sales Com¬ 
pany stock, while the Lehigh Valley Railroad paid over from its 
surplus the money needed to start the coal sales company in busi¬ 
ness. This was a bonus pure and simple to the stockholders, and 
at 5 per cent interest represents an annual loss to the road of 
1303,400. 

Since 1911 the Lehigh Valley has loaned |10,537,000 to the Lehigh 
Valley Coal Sales Company without interest, and has been deprived 
of 5 per cent, or |526,850 per year, upon this loan, a total in seven 
years of |3,687,850. 

Irrespective of the losses sustained through the operation and 
maintenance of the Morris Canal & Banking Company, investments 
ih coal lands and the gratis loan to the coal sales company, it is 
seen that the Lehigh Valley Railroad, since 1900, in excessive under¬ 
writing fees and unnecessary issuance of securities, has added 
$11,968,232 to its bonded debt, entailing an annual interest charge 
of $483,406, and has issued $4,000,000 in capital stock for which it 
received nothing, on which the dividend payments amount to 
$400,000 annually. 

In other words, since 1900 the railroad has incurred unnecessary 
yearly obligation of nearly $900,000, for which it received nothing 
in return. Including the transactions in connection with the coal 
sales company, the annual loss to the railroad through financial 
mismanagement is $1,713,398. 

4. Financial Performance of the Delaware, Lackawanna & 
Western Railroad Company. 

The financial performance of the Delaware, Lackawanna & West¬ 
ern Railroad illustrates the possibilities involved in the exploita¬ 
tion of the country’s resources in anthracite coal. Since its organi¬ 
zation in 1853 this company has disbursed cash and stock dividends 
to its stockholders with a prodigality that would have brought dis¬ 
aster to any less favorably situated railroad. 

During the last sixty years the stockholders of the company have 
received in cash dividends the enormous sum of $133,000,000. In 


21 


addition the company has declared capital stock dividend of 129 
per cent, and has donated in subscription rights to its stockholders 
136,000,000. It has also paid to its stockholders an aggregate of 
53 per cent in dividends in the stock of the Warren Railroad Com¬ 
pany, the Morris & Essex Railroad Company and the Lackawanna 
Railroad. 

In 1913 the stockholders of the Delaware, Lackawanna & Western 
were given the right to subscribe to an issue of |12,000,000 in capital 
stock of the company at par. The market value of this stock in 
1913, based on contemporaneous prices, was 400 per cent of par, or 
$48,000,000, but the railroad realized from its sale only $12,000,000. 
In other words, the sum of $36,000,000 was donated to the stock¬ 
holders. If this stock had been issued at its market value, the com¬ 
pany would have realized the amount actually received from the 
sale of these securities by an issue of only $3,000,000. Thus a total 
of $9,000,000 in unnecessary obligations was added to the company’s 
capitalization by this transaction alone. Including a capital stock 
dividend of 15 per cent declared in 1909, this is a total of $13,077,000 
in unnecessary securities added to the capital liabilities of the com¬ 
pany in ten years. The dividend disbursements on these obligations 
in 1918 amounted to $2,615,400, and since 1909 have aggregated 
$17,807,850. 

Since the organization of the Delaware, Lackawanna & Western 
Railroad in 1853 the stock dividends paid by the company have been 
as follows: In 1856, 3 per cent in Warren Railroad stock; in 1857, 
3 per cent in Warren Railroad stock; 1860, 24 per cent in Delaware, 
Lackawanna & Western stock; 1861, 6 per cent in Warren Railroad 
stock; 1863, 10 per cent in Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Rail¬ 
road stock; in 1864, 70 per cent in Delaware, Lackawanna & West¬ 
ern Railroad stock; in 1866, 10 per cent in Delaware, Lackawanna 
& Western Railroad stock; in 1870, 6 per cent in Morris & Essex 
Railroad stock; 1909, 15 per cent in Delaware, Lackawanna & 
Western Railroad stock; 1911, 35 per cent in Lackawanna Railroad 
stock. It is apparent from the foregoing that only a limited pro¬ 
portion of the company’s capital stock represents actual investment 
by the stockholders, a very large proportion having been issued in 
the form of stock dividends. 

In this connection it may be noted that the stockholders of the 
Delaware, Lackawanna & Western were paid 85 per cent in cash 
dividends in 1909, and, as pointed out above, were allowed to use 
37% per cent of this amount in subscribing at par to the capital 
stock of the Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Coal Company. 


22 


This company was organized by the officers and directors of the rail¬ 
road company for no other purpose, apparently, except to conceal 
the profits made by the latter company in the production of hard 
coal. Computed at the rate of 5 per cent, the annual interest on 
this unnecessary disbursement of $6,800,000 is $340,000. Since the 
organization of the sales company it is interesting to observe that 
it has paid a total of 300 per cent in dividends, and has accumulated 
a surplus of nearly $6,000,000. 


5. Dissipation of the Resources op the Delaware & Hudson. 

Although the Delaware & Hudson Company seems to have escaped 
the more flagrant excesses which prevailed during the railroad 
period of high finance, the flotation of the company’s securities has 
also been characterized by marked extravagance. During the ten- 
year period 1901-1909, for example, the Delaware & Hudson issued 
for cash securities to the par value of $103,408,000. The market 
value of these securities, based on contemporaneous quotations, was 
$115,387,441, but the railroad received from their sale only $104,- 
705,082. In other words, $10,682,359 was paid for commissions and 
underwriting fees for floating these securities. Computing interest 
at the rate of 5 per cent, this excess issue of securities represents 
an annual drain upon the resources of the Delaware & Hudson of 
$534,118, or a total disbursement during the ten-year period 1910- 
1919 alone of more than $5,000,000. Had the company’s finances 
been properly managed, in other words, this immense sum would 
not be available and could be used for making substantial increases 
in the rates of pay of the company’s employees without affecting in 
any way its present financial position. 


6. Stock Dividends op the Pennsylvania Railroad. 

In the flotation of securities at less than their market value the 
Pennsylvania Railroad Company during the ten years, 1901-1909, 
dissipated its resources to the extent of $131,754,921. The total par 
value of the securities issued for cash by the Pennsylvania during 
this period was $1,054,310,374, and the cash proceeds to the railroad, 
$1,082,857,661. As a consequence, the railroad, by the payment of 
underwriting fees, by granting bonuses to stockholders or permitting 
them to subscribe at a quotation less than the market value, or for 
other reasons, received, as pointed out above, $131,754,921 less than 


23 


it would have obtained if it had offered these securities for sale 
in the open market. Not one dollar of the enormous differences 
between contemporaneous market value and the cash received by 
the company was invested in the railroad or its equipment. No 
part of it was available for adding to the company’s earning power. 
By its financial practices the use of this enormous amount of capital 
was lost. There is no way of ascertaining what it would have 
yielded in the form of increased earnings. The income from the 
sum at 5 per cent per annum would be |6,587,746, which is a conserva¬ 
tive estimate of what an equivalent amount of new capital would 
have cost the company, and indicates the magnitude of the burden 
which it has incurred through financial mismanagement. 

7. Over-Oapitalization of the New York_, Ontario & Western. 

While no detailed examination has been made of the financial 
history of the New York, Ontario & Western Railroad Company, 
it is significant to note that its net capitalization per mile of road 
is more than double the average net capitalization per mile of road 
for the railroads of the country as a whole. It is also greatly in 
excess of the net capitalization per mile of road of other railroads 
in the same territory, such as the Delaware, Lackawanna & Western, 
the Lehigh Valley, the Delaware & Hudson, and the Pennsylvania. 

On December 31, 1918, the outstanding capitalization of the New 
York, Ontario & Western included |58,117,983 in capital stock and 
129,623,000 in funded debt, making a total gross capitalization of 
$87,740,983. Deducting from this amount securities owned by the 
company of the value of |8,770,000, leaves a net capitalization of 
$78,970,986. Reduced to a mileage basis, this is equivalent to an 
average for the 569 miles of road operated by the company in 1918, 
of $139,058 per mile. 

Computed on the same basis, the average net capitalization per 
mile of road for the railroads of the country as a whole, as of 
December 31, 1916, the latest period for which data are available, 
is only $66,356. For the Delaware & Hudson the figures as of 
December 31, 1918, are $94,000; for the Pennsylvania, $79,000; for 
the Lehigh Valley, $.53,000, and for the Delaware, Lackawanna & 
Western, $12,000. 

In view of the great disparity between the net capitalization of 
the New Y'ork, Ontario & Western and other railroads in the same 
territory, when reduced to a mileage basis, it seems evident that the 
former company is grossly over-capitalized. It is impossible. 


24 


in short, to explain the abnormally high capitalization of the 
company, except on the assumption that its securities are heavily 
watered. It would seem conservative, therefore, to assume that only 
about 145,000,000 of its capital liabilities represent actual invest¬ 
ment, as its capitalization on this basis amounts to approximately 
$65,000 per mile, which conforms very closely to the average for 
the railroads of the country as a whole. If the securities, which are 
clearly fictitious, be allocated to the capital stock of the company, 
the balance remaining, which may be taken as actual investment, is 
only 113,747,941. 

8. Dissipation of the Resources of the Erie Railroad. 

The history of the construction, development and management—or 
rather, mismanagement—of the Erie Railroad System is replete with 
events and transactions that are hardly believable, because of their 
gross injustice to the stockholders of the company and the general 
public. The extravagance and recklessness of the successive groups 
who gained control of the property has forced the Erie Railroad of 
today to bear a terrible financial burden. The company is now pay¬ 
ing the penalty of the financial sins of those who were its officers 
and directors years ago. 

It is impossible in this brief analysis to enumerate every instance 
in which the credit of the Erie has been weakened through financial 
mismanagement, but a few instances are cited to show the extremes 
to which officials of the company went in the exploitation of its 
resources. 

The events of the period 1866-1874 afford a typical illustration of 
the manner in which the Erie Railroad was systematically mis¬ 
managed until, in the latter year, it was forced into bankruptcy. 
These years witnessed a series of manipulations by three groups, 
whose terms in control may be called the Drew-Gould-Watson 
regimes. The vicious financial practices of these adventurers left 
little to the imagination as to methods for plundering a railroad. 

Several raids were made on the resources of the Erie’s treasury 
between 1866 and 1868 by Messrs. Drew and Gould through the total 
issuance of |15,800,000 of convertible bonds. These transactions 
were the culmination of a bitter struggle between Drew and Gould 
on the one hand and Cornelius Vanderbilt on the other hand for 
control of the Erie. The amounts made by the former groups and 
their associates from these raids, however, were comparatively 
insignificant when compared to the cost which the railroad had to 


25 


pay out of its treasury to settle the controversy and scandal which 
followed the leasing of the bankrupt Boston, Hartford & Erie Rail¬ 
road. The high-handed misuse of power and authority in this con¬ 
nection on the part of the Erie officials resulted in the enactment 
of legislation looking toward the future prevention of similar pro¬ 
ceedings. It also brought upon Drew, Gould, et al., a public 
denouncement from the State Investigating Committee for the 
frauds and abuses they practiced. In order to avoid serious legal 
difficulties, settlements were arranged out of court with those who 
were involved in the agreement between the Erie Railroad and the 
Boston, Hartford & Erie Railroad, which cost the former company’s 
greatly impoverished treasury more than |9,000,000. 

In 1868 Jay Gould and James Fisk attained control of the Erie 
Railroad, securing their election as president, treasurer and comp¬ 
troller, respectively. In order to insure their continued control of 
the property, they eliminated the majority of the other officers, and 
in 1870, with characteristic effrontery, obtained a court order lead¬ 
ing to the seizure of a large block of stock which had been deposited 
in this country by English stockholders. The extent of their mis¬ 
appropriation of the road’s finances is clearly shown when it is 
pointed out that there was an increase of the company’s capitaliza¬ 
tion during the years 1868-1871 of approximately |62,000,000, while 
the property account for the same period showed an increase of 
slightly more than |12,000,000. To partially account for this 
extraordinary increase of capital these ruthless financial pirates 
padded the construction accounts of the old New York & Erie Rail¬ 
road by over |47,000,000. This company had been the predecessor 
of the Erie Railroad, and its affairs,had been completely closed out 
in 1862 at a figure under 139,000,000. This construction account 
contained a great many questionable items of expense, and, in the 
language of the investigating committee of the New York Assembly, 
it not only covered actual expenditures to the property, but also 
covered ‘‘a multitude of sins.” 

Gould, by his speculation in, and manipulation of Erie stocks and 
bonds in Wall street, imposed irreparable injury to the company, 
and his disgraceful financial management of the property finally 
brought about his downfall in 1872. The prices of the large blocks 
of stock and the bonds which he issued were slaughtered in the 
market, and brought to the road as income a very small percentage 
of their value. Most of these securities were sold through a broker¬ 
age firm in which Gould was a partner and netted him very large 
returns. Gould constantly drained the Erie Railroad of revenues 
to pay off his speculative losses in securities of other railroad proper- 


26 


ties; to secure his re-election as a director of the company, and he 
even issued stock, the proceeds from which were never turned over 
to the railroad. Suit was finally brought against him for embezzle¬ 
ment, but the company received very little back for the millions he 
had secured from it. His removal from control was finally secured 
through some London interests, headed by James McHenry, who 
bribed a number of members of the Board of Directors to resign so 
that they might be replaced by others unfriendly to Gould. The 
amount of bribe money expended was |750,000, and shortly after 
1460,000 of this amount was paid out of the Erie’s treasury. This 
expenditure would have been a measure of marked economy had it 
brought into power a group who were actually concerned with the 
interest of the property and stockholders, but such was not the case. 
James H. Watson, as head of the so-called ^^reform” element, became 
president of the Erie Railroad in 1872. 

The new heads of the property immediately added another terrible 
burden to the long-suffering Erie by negotiating a loan in London 
through McHenry and some English banking concerns. This loan 
was practically peddled in London at ruinous rates of discount. 
It consisted of two issues of bonds amounting to |25,000,000, of 
which 1600,000 was held as collateral for loans placed in the United 
States. The revenue actually received for these 124,400,000 of bonds 
was only |14,200,000, together with a number of claims against 
worthless parties for small balances. Shortly after this episode 
Mr. Watson was asked to resign as head of the Erie, and the prop¬ 
erty, which had been practically insolvent for about a year, went 
into a receivership. 

Summarizing the results of nearly a decade of vicious financial 
mismanagement, it appears that the capital stock of the Erie Rail¬ 
road, which in 1866 was $25,111,210, had increased by 1875 to 
$86,536,910; the funded debt increased during the same period from 
$22,429,920 to $54,271,814, while the floating debt decreased from 
$3,638,514 to $1,421,642, or a total net increase for the period, from 
1866 to 1875, of $91,050,722. As representing values put into the 
property accounts as a result of these capital commitments, the 
records show an increase of only $19,416,005. As mentioned above, 
a ludicrous attempt was made partially to account for this dis¬ 
crepancy by writing up the construction account of the New York & 
Erie Railroad, but there was no pretense even made of accounting 
for a very considerable proportion of this increase in capitalization. 

The inflation of the capitalization and property accounts of the 
Erie is strikingly shown by an inventory taken by the receiver after 
his appointment in 1875. A report was issued in 1878 by the direc- 


27 


tors of the reorganized railroad company, in which the cost of the 
road and equipment was given as 1117,140,287, while the capitaliza¬ 
tion was stated as 1152,072,604. The inventory taken by the receiver 
showed that the road and equipment of the railroad could have been 
replaced in 1877 for |40,000,000, and that |25,000,000 would have 
covered the value of the securities of other corporations which were 
owned by the company. The total, therefore, of 165,000,000 repre¬ 
sented the outstanding capitalization, or approximately 187,000,000 
less than the capitalization carried on the books, while the book 
value of the road and equipment exceeded its actual value by about 
177,000,000. There is probably no more disgraceful showing by any 
other railroad. It was entirely logical that such a financial policy 
in a corporation would result in a receivership. 

Coming down now to a more contemporaneous date, it is found 
that the resources of the Erie were still being dissipated. However, 
what was lacking in finesse in the days when Gould and his asso¬ 
ciates were plundering the property was furnished in ample degree 
by the banking interests that purchased the Pennsylvania Coal 
Company for the Erie in 1902. The net results of the methods used 
by each group of men were identical, inasmuch as the railroad 
was finally encumbered with an additional burden of unnecessary 
or fictitious security issues. 

The purchase of this coal property, together with a small, dilapi¬ 
dated railroad, and another railroad which existed on paper, im¬ 
posed an unjustifiable burden on the earnings of the Erie Railroad. 
In the acquisition of this property the Erie issued $32,000,000 of 
bonds and $5,000,000 of first preferred stock. It later developed 
that the syndicate which handled the purchase of the property for 
the Erie secured the stock of the coal company and the railroads 
for $27,600,000, and as this financial group was able to dispose of 
the $37,000,000 of Erie securities for about $32,080,000, their profit 
was approximately $4,480,000. If the Erie had not been under the 
control of these bankers, the property could have been secured 
by the issuance of slightly more than $29,000,000 of bonds without 
the additional issue of preferred stock, which would have resulted 
in a saving to the company in the amount of its annual fixed charges 
of $120,000. 

A study of the amount of the securities issued by the Erie Rail¬ 
road during the period 1900-1910 was made by the Railroad Securi¬ 
ties Commission, which not only compared the par and market value 
of the securities issued, but also gave the amounts actually received 
by the company. The investigation by this Commission showed that 


28 


between 1901-1908 the Erie Railroad issued for cash certain bonds 
and notes with a par value of |53,128,000. The market value of 
these securities at the time they were issued was |51,924,878, but 
on account of the commissions paid to bankers and underwriters 
the Erie Railroad received only $49,539,859, or slightly more than 
93 per cent of the par value. If the company had sold its securities 
at the market value instead of marketing them through a banking 
syndicate, the same amount of money could have been realized by 
an issue of $50,690,534 in bonds and notes. The Erie Railroad, 
therefore, issued unnecessary securities to the amount of $2,437,466. 
The income from this sum at 5 per cent per annum would be 
$121,873, which indicates the loss incurred by the company through 
this excessive capitalization. 

As previously stated, it is impossible in this summary to give 
every instance in which the Erie Railroad has suffered through 
financial mismanagement, but it is believed that enough cases have 
been cited to substantiate the statement that this property is grossly 
overcapitalized. It might be mentioned that the capitalization of 
the Erie Railroad per mile of road is greatly above that for the 
average of the railroads in the country as a whole, and particularly 
exceeds that for railroads operating in the same territory. 

On December 31, 1918, the outstanding capitalization of the Erie 
Railroad included $176,386,300 in capital stock and $282,403,673 
in funded debt, making a total gross capitalization of $458,789,973. 

Deducting from this amount securities owned by the company of 
the book value of $136,560,000 leaves a net capitalization of $322,- 
230,649. Reduced to a mileage basis, this is equivalent to an average 
for the 2,258 miles of road operated by the company of $142,711 
per mile. This figure, it may be noted, exceeds the net capitaliza¬ 
tion per mile of road in the case of the Delaware & Hudson by 
$48,711, and is $63,711 in excess of the average per mile of the 
Pennsylvania, $89,711 in excess of the average for the Lehigh Valley 
and $130,711 greater than the capitalization of the Delaware, 
Lackawanna & Western when reduced to a mileage basis. It is also 
$76,355 in excess of the average per mile for the railroads of the coun¬ 
try as a whole. 

As there is no apparent reason why the capitalization of the Erie 
which represents actual investment should exceed the capitaliza¬ 
tion of such railroads as the Lehigh Valley or the Pennsylvania, 
it would seem conservative to estimate the water in its capital 
liabilities at $165,000,000. On this basis, its capitalization is re¬ 
duced to approximately the par value of its funded debt, or an aver- 


29 


age rate of about $70,000 per mile. In other words, the capital 
stock of the company, with the exception of about $12,000,000 in 
preferred stock, is purely fictitious, and should be eliminated from 
consideration in any study of the financial position of the company 
and its ability to pay increased wages to its employees. 


9. Rate op Return On Actual Investment. 


By allocating to the capital stock of the anthracite railroads the 
capital liabilities which they have incurred through financial mis¬ 
management so far as our limited data shows, it is possible to ascer¬ 
tain for these companies the rate of return on that proportion of 
their capital stock which represents actual investment. The fig¬ 
ures computed on this basis for seven of the principal anthracite 
railroads are shown for the period 1913-1918 in the table below. 

It will be noted that the rate of return on actual investment 
reached a very high level, ranging up to 60.68 per cent, op the 
capital stock of the Delaware, Lackawanna & Western, and as high 
as 40.08 for the Reading Company. 


PERCENT OP INCOME EARNED BY ANTHRACITE RAILROADS ON THAT 
PROPORTION OF THEIR CAPITAL STOCK WHICH REPRESENTS 
ACTUAL INVESTMENT. 


Year. 

Reading 

Company. 

Per cent. 

Lehigh 

VaHey. 

Per cent. 

Delaware 
Lacka¬ 
wanna & 
Western. 

Per cent. 

Delaware, 

& 

Hudson. 

Per cent. 

Penn¬ 

sylvania. 

Per cent. 

Erie. 

Per cent. 

New York, 
Ontario 
& 

Western. 

Per cent. 

1913. 

37.52 

19.63 

53.04 

21.93 

11.19 

61.17 

8.81 

1914. 

40.08 

15.81 

36.23 

12.98 

9.71 

11.86 

4.83 

1915. 

31.90 

14.65 

37.15 

17.41 

8.87 

8.42 

4.46 

1916. 

35.01 

17.65 

48.82 

18.28 

14.34 

86.67 

7.16 

1917. 

35.02 

16.02 

60.68 

15.69 

9.90 

15.40 

7.11 

1918L... 


14.77 

48.83 

14.82 

11.86 

60.80 

5.86 

1918'.... 

*38.00 

3.97 

55.91 

2.43 

6.35 




^Guaranteed income account. 

'Combined corporate and Federal Income Account. 
'Corporate Income Account. 

















































